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THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE CARIBBEAN BASIC INITIATIVE:
A CASE STUDY OF THE HONDURAN EXPORT SECTOR
Abstract:

I.

This paper studies the historical background of the Honduran economy
and the problems faced by the Honduran export sector to develop nontraditional export products. The evidence suggests that structural
and institutional deficiencies pose a fundamental bottleneck in the
development of a viable export sector.

Introduction
Developing countries are facing a pressing need to stimulate economic

development amidst growing world economic and political problems.

Development

plans to help alleviate economic and political problems have fallen short and
today, many countries are facing a reverse economic spiral which threatens to
undo the gains of the past two decades.

Honduras, one of the poorest countries

in the Caribbean Basin, is one such country, struggling with a weak economy and
rising political and economic problems.
sharp economic downturn.

In 1980, Honduras began to suffer a

Gross National Product grew by only 2%., as compared.

to an average 7.8% in the previous four years.

By mid-1983, real growth in GNP

turned negative to minus 1.1%.
On the domestic front, the industrial sector, accounting for 15% of Gross
Domestic Product, in the past one of the most dynamic sectors of the economy,
also showed signs of sluggishness.

Real growth in 1983 was minus 1.3%, as com-

pared to an average 4.8% in the previous two years.

The industrial sector faced

a dwindling supply of financial resources for working capital, plant expansion,
and needed inputs, as the economy contracted in a recessionary wold environment.
This sector experienced a 24% dropoff in exports to Central America.

Similarly,

the slow-down in external demand had a strong impact on the Honduran export
sector, which accounts for one-third of total output.

Moreover, the political

problem unfolding in Central America motivated increased capital flight and discouraged investments in the domestic economies of the area.
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Honduras export dependence is relatively high.
GNP represents 37% of total output.

Exports as percentage of

In the past two years, it has been severe-

ly affected by falling prices and a slackening of demand in international markets.

In 1982, total exports declined 12.4% while imports declined by 19.4%.

Bananas,

Honduras'. main export crop, which accounts for one-third of total ex-

ports, increased by only 2%.
declined by 11.4%.

Coffee exports, another important export product,

Meat exports declined by 25% while sugar exports toppled

This last category was strongly affected by falling world prices and the

47%.

implementation of a U. S. sugar quota.

The best export performance was posted

by seafood products (shrimp and lobster), an important emerging export in recent years.

Seafood exports rose by 6.6% from 1981 levels.

Other exports

(metals, tobacco, lumber) also suffered from declining prices in world markets.
In the wide range of "non-traditional" exports, growth was stagnant although some products performed well (light manufactures, ornamental plants,
melons, pineapples, and other fruits and vegetables).

Although exports of these

products is small in terms of the total, they offer greater

growth potential

than traditional products in light of current international trade patterns and
structure.
In contrast, imports of goods and services continued to grow at a brisk
pace.

By 1982, import demand began to slow down affected by recessionary times,

and for the first time in many years, the balance of payments was almost at
equilibrium.

However, the large deficits of previous years led to a series of

unprecedented deficits in the balance of payments.

The result was a decline

of 73% in the net international reserves for the period between 1980 and 1982.
Preliminary extimates for 1983 indicate that these trends are likely to continue, placing severe pressures in foreign exchange availability.
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In an economy where 60% of imports are capital equipment, raw materials, intermediate goods and another 24% is petroleum, the ability to finance imports
affects the development of the economy as a whole and particularly that of
the industrial sector.

Availability of raw materials, inputs, and final products,

by necessity, become conditioned to a system of priorities and controls which
inhibits growth and development.

Considering Honduras' export dependence,

these developments create a very difficult situation for a small and poor country
with limited resources to face its economic development needs.
The deteriorating economic conditions, the weakness of the export sector,
and the political problem unfolding in the area pose a strategic problem to the
Honduran industrial sector.

The problem centers around the ability of the Hon-

duran industrial sector to take full advantage of the preferential treatments
provided by the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

The CBI entails a one-way access to

U. S., markets for products of the countries in the region for a twelve-year
period.

The CBI also provides incentives to promote investment in the region

to accelerate job creation and expansion of production capabilities.

The major

thrust of the CBI is to promote the exports of "non-traditional" products, an
important component of world trade today.

Since access to markets cannot in it-

self create the necessary conditions for successful product introduction and
consumer acceptance, other factors that affect access must be taken into consideration.

It is important, then, to try to understand the underlying factors

which may affect Honduras and its ability to take advantage of these incentives.
This paper will focus on the factors that affect access to export markets
and the problems faced by the industrial sector in developing viable export products.
The underlying thesis of this paper is that exporting of manufactured products
require techniques and skills which are influenced by product and market char-
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Selling such products requires extensive marketing effort and know-

ledge of sophisticated marketing systems.

Moreover, market structure is char-

acterized by oligopolistic competition, where a few large firms dominate, performing extensive marketing to sell their products with highly specialized
distribution systems.

The rationality of the marketplace, then, requires a.

direction and degree of marketing specialization which may not be present in
the Honduran industrial sector at the present time and which may affect its
capabilities to export.
In order to develop this analysis, it is necessary to evaluate the Honduran manufacturing and export sectors, as well as existing facilitating institutions and mechanisms in the system.

The purpose is to identify problems and

present needs in order to develop guidelines for an export development strategy
that can provide a working framework for the development of the exports of manufactured products within the context of the international marketplace.
II.

OVERVIEW OF THE HONDURAN ECONOMY
a.

Historical Analysis

Honduras is the second largest country in Central America, yet it is the
poorest.

Its mountainous terrain, which covers.64% of its land, remains mostly

unused due to inaccessibility and low population density.

Its population of

3.4 million people is a very young one with about half under the age of 15.
Its labor force accounts for 28.8% of its population, making the dependency
ratio (the proportion of productive to nonproductive groups in society) relatively high.

Its geographic location makes it a natural for international

commerce with the United States, the Caribbean, the northern part of Latin America, and Western Africa.
Honduras was discovered by Cristobal Colon and became a part of the
Spanish Colonial Empire.

The Spaniards, however, left the large Honduran terri-

- 5 tory almost uninhabited.

When the Spanish arrived in the Central American region,

the Indian population had all but disappeared with the exception of small groups
in the central highlands of the territory.

The Spanish came to the free world

seeking previous metals and centered economic activity around this pursuit,
with few thoughts on long range economic development.

Honduras, like other

Spanish colonial territories, was subjected to economic mercantilism, a highly
restrictive and exclusive system of trade favorable to Spain.

This control re-

sulted in myriad prohibitions and restrictions which restrained

Honduran

trade with the Central American territory as well as other Spanish territories
and inhibited internal economic development.
Honduras came under Spanish control as part of New Spain, a territory
which included what is today Mexico and Central America.

Inasmuch as Central

America was not particularly rich in precious metals, the economic history of
this colonial territory can best be described as the constant search by the
Spanish for a key to fast wealth.

This meant centering economic activity in

developing one export crop at a time.
dinary singlemindedness.

Each endeavor was pursued with extraor-

These activities condemned the region to a series of

booms and busts, as the products would enjoy a period of prosperity and profit,
then decline and disappear

(McLeod, 1973).

This type of economic activity precluded any long range economic stability
and inhibited development of domestic factors of production.

This eventually led

to a stagnant Central American economy dependent on a series of agricultural monoexperts henceforth.

In the middle of the 16th century, however, it became appar-

ent that the streams and rivers of Honduras offered great potential for gold
mining.

Consequently, Honduras became the center of gold panning activities in

the Central America territory.

The initial gold exports were relatively large

and promising and Honduras became the most important producer of gold in the
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The decline of the gold industry was all too familiar.

In the absence

of adequate promotion of the mining industry and lack of manpower, the primitive
extractive

industry

was soon reduced to a trickle.

However, silver discoveries

around Tegucigalpa once again made Honduras one of the major exporters of precious
metals in the area.
economy.

The silver discoveries produced another boom in the Honduran

Negro slaves were introduced to increase the labor force.

However,

primitive technology and an exploitation of human resources finally hampered the
industry.

The inability or unwillingness of the Spanish to provide inputs to

increase production (for example, Spain was reluctant to provide mercury to extract silver by more modern processes) quickly inhibited further development of
the industry.

The prevalent fraud present in colonial mining industry also af-

fected the development of this industry.

The Honduran mining industry enjoyed

only a fleeting prosperity and soon the Honduran economy, its resources depleted,
was once again ignored by the Spanish authorities.

The brief periods of pros-

perity had given rise to a weak economy with a small and weak resource base,
and lacking a dynamic element to develop the territory into a viable economic
system, Honduras soon became a poverty stricken territory (McLeod, 1973).
The stagnant economies of Central America, greatly dissatisfied with
colonial economic policies, made separate bids for independence and became independent nations in 1821.

For a brief period in 1824 the Central American coun-

tries attempted to maintain economic and political unity by initiating an experiment in Federalism.

Disagreements and political bickering, however, dissolved

the union and the Central American region became a group of five independent
nations-states: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.
b.

The Export Economy of the Twentieth Century

A rapidly rising demand for bananas in the United States gave Honduras
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an opportunity to enter the international economy once again at the end of the
19th century.

Due to its geographical location and proximity to the U. S. mar-

ket, Honduras had a special comparative advantage in growing this product, and
soon became a major producer of this product.

The export industry became the

backbone of the Honduran economy and would dominate its export sector and the
Honduran economy for the next six or seven decades.

Entry into international

markets, however, was thrust upon Honduras by external agents, as the lack of

adequate resource base allowed a few U.S. firms to dominate this export industry,
bringing in capital and management capabilities, as well as the extensive marketing
network necessary to distribute and sell the product in

the United States.

These

U. S. multinational corporations became a dominant factor in the development of
the Honduran economy in the early part of the twentieth century (Rodriguez, 1965).
Honduras became a typical export economy becoming the stereotype of the
"banana republic".

The impact of these multinational companies brought the Hon-

duran economy into the international economic system, but the domestic market
remained weak and small.

Investors and managers, both foreign and domestic,

became income-remitting agents leaving the bulk of the profits in foreign banks
and generating a strong demand for imported consumer goods which were not produced
in Honduras.

The small domestic market precluded producing these luxury goods

domestically, and the low purchasing power of the majority of the population
did not warrant investment in domestic production.

A commercial class quickly

developed and an ethnically distinct group became the dominant factor in import
trade.

This group represented the more economically developed group in the

domestic economy, catering to the whims and tastes of the wealthy and the foreign
managers.

- 8The economic impact of these activities was soon evident in the balance of
trade.

The foreign investors, managers, the wealthy, and the small trading

group consumed imported luxuries and invested little in the development of
the domestic economy.

The income generated by exports and profits from domestic

activities were either remitted abroad looking for more profitable opportunities
or spent on imported luxuries at home.
d.
It

The Central American Common Market
was apparent, then, that the outward model of growth led by the export

sector had failed to contribute to the needed levels of economic development.
Consequently,

the governments of Central American countries decided to take a

more active role in economic activity by directing the economic development effort.

Under the auspices of the United Nations, and following prevailing

economic development theories of the 1950s, the Central American countries rejected models of outward development and chose import substitution industrialization as a catalyst to promote rapid and sustained economic growth.

The

development model entailed the stimulation of the industrial sector through a
series of selected incentives to provide the necessary linkages to stimulate
the rest of the economy.

The objective was the diffusion of income and earn-

ings into the economy and thus create larger and more affluent markets for
self-sustained economic growth and development (Castillo, 1966; Villagran Kramer,
1970; McLelland, 1972; Orantes, 1972; Pincus, 1972; SIECA, 1973);
One of the most important elements of this development plan was the new
role of government in the economic process.

Under the new economic arrangement,

government was to become an intermediary, directing economic activity for the
benefit of the domestic economy and creating a domestic resource base necessary
to generate the dynamic, self-sustained economic growth sought by the development

S9The promotion of the industrial activities was envisioned as the way

model.

to stimulate the development of domestic capital and human resources and create
the resource base necessary to spur economic development.
The five Central American countries formed the Central American Common
Market (CACM) in an effort to overcome the limits of each country's small mar-

kets and create a larger regional market to facilitate industrial growth.

The

initial results were positive, as industrial production increased rapidly.
Nevertheless, by the early 1970's, it became apparent that this effort was insufficient.

True, significant gains were made as output increased and the

economies became diversified.

Within a decade, intra-regional trade increased

800% and per capita income grew almost 50%.

The industrialization process,

however, soon reached its limits within the existing framework.
New problems were now faced by the Central American countries.

Labor

absorption, an important element of the import substitution model, was not fully
realized to the extent necessary to provide an income generating force in the
economy.

Consequently, aggregate demand remained relatively static as the mass

markets never materialized.

Similarly, the extensive subsidies and protective

measures affected the efficiency of the industrial sector, giving rise to a thin
sector composed mainly of light industries throughout Central America, all producing similar products.

Moreover, the benefits of intraregional trade were

not evenly distributed, as Guatemala and El Salvador generated two-thirds of
the intraregional trade and attracting a significant portion of foreign investment.
Furthermore, the structure of the external sector changed as the import
coefficient grew faster than exports.

Demand for consumer goods, industrial
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raw materials, and semi-finished goods quickly began to outpace

the ability

of the export sector to provide foreign exchange to finance such purchases.
Finally, the economic development rationale which formulated a framework which
included a high degree of government intervention to promote the development of
an adequate infrastructure, propelled the public sector as a demander of foreign
exchange in its attempt to accelerate economic development by financing development projects with external resources.

Acting as an intermediary to promote

social and economic progress without consideration of economic restrictions, the
government in effect placed further strains on foreign exchange earnings.
From theoutset, it was evident that the policies aimed at developing a
domestic industrial base would not be carried out without foreign investment
inasmuch as the domestic economy lacked technology and domestic capital to embark in such an ambitious development program.

Thus it became necessary to in-

clude foreign investment in the development model.

One immediate result

was

the introduction of one more claim on foreign exchange earnings, as remission
of a percentage of profits was initially guaranteed by foreign investment incentives.

Moreover, since the incentives created opportunities to invest in the

manufacturing sector, multinational companies quickly moved into light industries,
producing mostly non-durable goods.

Thus, product offerings were not the result

of indigenous product development activities but corporate strategy.

Moreover,

the strategy of including foreign investment in the development model brought a
proliferation of trademarks and brands and the corresponding commitment of resources to specific brand advertising.

Consumers, therefore, may have paid high-

er prices for products under import substitution that would appear justified.
The highly-subsidized industrialization process with its foreign component

-
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resulted in an industrial sector composed mainly of assembly or conversion-type
industries, i.e., industrial processes requiring very limited capital investment
(light industry) with a relatively small percent of value added by the local
economy but with a high content of semi-finished inputs provided by external
agents, with the resulting additional demand on foreign exchange.

Moreover,

since all Central American countries developed similar product offerings, the
small and static markets were soon saturated as the industrial sectors competed
with similar products in the same markets.
The new economic development framework, therefore, required increased ab-

sorption of foreign exchange earnings by the industrial as well as the public
sectors.

In the absence of any link between industrial policy, government expen-

ditures, and increases or reductions in export earnings, import substitution industrialization laid the groundwork for the inflationary pressures of the 1970's.
Additional pressures arose as the government increased the monetary supply to
accelerate economic activity and augment aggretate income.

A rising bill for

petroleum imports in the 1970's and the world recessionary period further aggravated the problem and placed the economy in a very precarious position.

The

automatic balancing of the international trade account through a reduction of
imports or through higher tariffs and other restrictions became a zero-sum game
by the end of the 1970's.

Foreign debt payments and petroleum imports became

priority items in the use of scarce foreign exchange.

The import dependent in-

dustrial sector soon began to face input shortages leading to underutilization
of its productive capacity.
The Central American common market went into a crisis in 1969, and it
did not survive the crisis.

Some of the elements of the common market arrange-
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ments are still observed on a bilateral basis.

It can be said, as an after-

thought, that the decision to become part of the Central American common market
did not give Honduras all of the advantages it sought.

It did, however, provide

the basis to start a domestic industrial resource base, an objective sought by
the development policies.
d.

The Honduran Economy Today
i. The Industrial Sector

The industrial development process was important inasmuch as it enabled
the industrial sector to grow.

The "common market era" in Honduras, however, did

little to create the type of industrial sector which could eventually contribute
to the dynamic self-sustained growth of the Honduran economy.
Examining the industrial sector today, it

can be found that, while the

actual number of industrial enterprises increased during the initial impetus of
import substitution, the degree of industrialization of the participation of industrial output in Gross Domestic Product increased modestly.

In 1960, the in-

dustrial sector accounted for 12% of value added to Gross Domestic Product.

By

mid-1970's, the sectoral participation rose to 13.3% rising to 15% by 1980.

The

industrial sector, however, is composed mainly of small and medium-sized firms,
a majority of which (73%) average ten employees or less.
Similarly, the composition of output remained relatively unchanged.

As

shown in Table 1, in 1980, 86.6% of the total industrial output came from traditional or cottage industries, roughly the same participation as in 1960.
Intermediate industries increased sectoral participation, accounting for 12.1%
of the total industrial output by 1980.

The metalmachinery industry showed

little dynamism as sectoral participation declined in the 1970-1980 decade.

- 13 Table 1
HONDURAS:

OUTPUT OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

(in percentages)
1960

1970

1980

86.6

83.7

86.4

Intermediary Industries

7.7

10.7

12.1

Metal Machinery Industries

7.3

6.0

1.

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

Final Consumption

Secretaria Permanente del Tratado de Integracion
Sources
Economica Centroamericana (SIECA), and Banco Central
de Honduras.
As the Central American market unfolded, the Honduran industrial sector
lost some ground domestically to Central American industries.

In the early 60's,

the Honduran economy consumed 57.3% from domestic supply, but by the end of the
decade, this had declined to 55%.
inroads in the Honduran market.

Central American products made significant
While in 1960, the economy consumed only 5% of

products of the region, and by 1970, it was consuming 11.3% (SIECA, 1973).
Undoubtedly, the modernizing aspect of the import substitution process
had a positive effect on industrial output and income.

However, the industrial

development process was stymied by lack of adequate coordination taking into
account balance of payment effects and the utilization of domestic raw materials and resources.

Consequently, the Honduran industrial sector evolved into

a small group of assembly or conversation-type light industries which have a
high dependency on external inputs, providing few linkages with the domestic
resource base.
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ii)

Non-Traditional Exports
Exports of non-traditional agricultural and manufactured products are be-

coming a factor in the economic development of less-developed countries.

In-

ternational trade patterns today suggest that there are significant opportunities in this type of export as an additional source of foreign exchange and a
stabilizer in the economy.

Selling non-traditional products in world markets,

however, entails a higher degree of marketing expertise.

Products sold in the

more affluent markets of industrial countries must meet special market conditions in terms of price, quality, design, and distribution.in a highly competitive environment.

Consequently, the export activities of the firm require care-

ful planning and diversification.

This means adequate knowledge of the market,

consumer motivations, development of exportable products, comprehensive promotional strategies, and design of adequate channels of distribution that can
guarantee delivery of the products where and when the consumer wants them.
A careful on site analysis of the Honduran non-traditional export sectors
in terms of the opportunities and skills required to serve world markets identified problem areas in its structure, dependency, and managerial infrastructure.
Structure
Industrial activity in Honduras is still expanding.

Industries such as

food processing, leather, shoes, cement, textiles, radios, televisions, chemicals, furniture, handicrafts, clothing, and agri-industrial firms are preparing
for exports.

The export offerings of non-traditional products are primarily

composed of non-durable goods such as plastic products (keyholders, wallets,
folders, etc.), kitchen utensils, soaps, detergents, toothpaste, disinfectants,
cookies, pastries, handtools, toothpicks, pharmaceutical products (OTC), bottle
caps, disposable cartons, plates, and dinnerware, shoes and shoe soles, heels,

- 15 etc., zippers, as well as other products such as aluminum furniture, windows,
operating parts, doors and screens.

Exports of non-traditional agricultural

products include shrimp, lobster, ornamental plants, melons, pineapples, and
other fruits and vegetables.

It can be readily observed that the export offer

is aimed at markets where competition is intense as domestic production is

likely to be strong and markets saturated.

A perusal of the Honduran marketing

activities indicated that firms with exportable supply have little marketing
expertise for international markets, making exporting a very difficult venture
for the average Honduran firm wishing to tap foreign market opportunities.
Dependency
A very serious problem confronting the Honduran industrial sector is the
shortage of foreign exchange to pay for needed inputs.
ports are bananas, coffee and metals (see Table 2).

Honduras' main ex-

The first two products

account for over half of total exports, while manufacturing products accounts
for only 2.4% of total exports.
Tabli

2

HONDURAS: MAIN EXPORT PRODUCTS
(as % of Total Exports)
Product

1979

1980

1981

1982

Bananas

27.3

27.7

27.7

34.0

Coffee

26.8

24.8

22.2

23.8

Lead, Zinc and Silver

11.8

10.7

11.0

4.4

Refrigerated Meat, Shrimp
and Lobster

8.3

7.4

5.9

8.8

Sugar, Tobacco, Cotton

8.3

9.7

12.5

6.7

Manufactured Products

1.7

1.7

1.9

2.4

Source&

Banco Central de Honduras
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The shortage of funds is accentuated by the government's disbursement
policies.

The primary demands of foreign exchange are the industrial sector

and the government.

The industrial sector needs foreign exchange to pay for

inputs to maintain present levels of production and employment.

The latter

needs resources to pay for and service debts incurred by the government to
finance economic development projects, many of which have not reached the
In order to fulfill these needs, the government

productivity projected.

must set priorities in allocating foreign exchange, assigning the highest
priorities to government needs and importation of inputs for the agricultural
sector.

Given the structure of the industrial sector and its reliance on for-

eign inputs, the problem posed by the weakening external sector has adversely
affected the dynamics of the industrial sector.

The slow down of the indus-

trial sector has affected the retail and wholesale sectors as well, and as a
result, the recessionary climate has had a negative impact on investment planning as the private sector takes a "wait and see" attitude.
Managerial Infrastructure
The Honduran industrial manager can best be described as a commercial industrialist, i.e., a type of businessman which is more of a salesman than a
risk-taker, in contrast with the typical risk-taking entrepreneur which characterized the industrial development process of most industrialized nations.
This is a result of the protective unbrella of import substitution industrialization.

Under captive markets, risk taking is minimized, and product inno-

vation and marketing expertise is reduced considerably simply because there
is no need for them.

In highly saturated international markets, however, these

two factors become crucial competitive tools.

The commercial industrialist
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must compete against companies with extensive marketing experience in the U.S.
and international markets where marketing is a premium and risk taking, and
product innovations are, in many instances, a necessity for survival.
Perhaps the most striking problem of the industrial sector is the inherent bias introduced in product decision by import substitution indistrialization.

In a protected environment, product decisions were made to conform to

development policies.

The rationale for product decisions was affected by

the number of jobs created, the level of technology acquired, and the effect
on output and income.

Thus, a firm found itself with the latest technology

and excess capacity, serving a small captive market and no identified export
market to absorb excess capacity.
This decision making process may have some validity in captive markets
of developing countries, however, in international markets, the firm must take
a different approach, that is, produce the products that sell and be able to
identify markets and develop a strategy to serve them.

The ability to identi-

fy opportunities in international markets and the decision making process thereof requires a high level of marketing expertise, especially in the markets of
manufactured products.
III.

PROBLEMS OBSERVED
The problems affecting the Honduran economy and affecting the non-tradi-

tional export sector can be summarized as follows:
a.

Financial Problems
1.

Shortage of working capital that inhibits the industrial firm's growth

and its ability to develop markets adequately.
2.

High cost of credit and restrictive credit policies (such as quantity
restrictions and exhorbitant collateral requirements) that inhibit
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capital formation and plant expansion required to tap foreign markets.
3. Non-availability of credit capital, rendering the Honduran industrial
sector incapable of providing supplier's credit, seriously affecting its competitiveness in world markets.
4.

Delays in providing foreign exchange and threats of devaluation causes

uncertainty and raises costs to the exporter.
5.

Lack of any meaningful government policy to address any of the prob-

lems listed above.
b.

Marketing Problems
1.

Assembly-type or conversion-type industries have little

advantage in product, quality, and/or price.

competitive

Few inter-industry linkages

make thse industries import-dependent and raise the cost of export products.
2.

Quality standards and product offerings that are not directed at satis-

fying international demand but are closely linked to internal development and"
employment policies, rendering many products inadequate for international markets.

Existing exportable supply is, for the most part, of non-durable con-

sumer products, where competition is the keenest.
3. Higher transportation costs to the United States and the Caribbean
arising from the reduction of imports.

Especially affected is air transporta-

tion, since the reduction of imports forced airlines to reduce the number of
flight. and increase the price of transportation causing problems to the export
sector.

Air transportation to other areas (Northern Latin American and Western

Africa) is generally not adequate as there is no direct link with those markets
due to the small volume of trade.

Sea transportation is generally adequate to

the United States, although the rates are relatively high due to low levels
of
cargo shipments.

Access to other markets in Latin America or Africa is and con-

- 19 tinues to be a problem as availability of services is very low, sometimes nonexistent.
c.

Institutional Problems
1.

Inadequate government and private sector cooperation.

Even though

evidence suggests there is a high degree of consultation, Government assigns
itself the highest priority in the foreign exchange market squeezing the private sector and straining its resources.

2. Lack of an adequate export promotion program.

Export development

laws make exporting very cumbersome (registration procedures, paperwork,
taxes).

For example, the export tax, an anachronism of the past, is a dis-

torting disincentive in an economy that sorely needs foreign exchange.
3.

Overprotection of domestic industries.

that effects efficiency.

That acts as a disincentive

It impacts on competitive ability, especially in

markets where most opportunities lie for the efficient marketing-oriented
producer.
4.

Lack of private sector cooperation.

Although inter-industry groups

exist, most are concerned in studying national problems, rather than concentrating in creating effective machanisms to develop a viable export sector
for manufacturers.

Attempts are being made in this direction, but efforts are

still insufficient to generate an adequate mechanism to serve the manufactured
export sector adequately.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Recent world trade patterns in manufactured products, have tended to shift

international division of labor to the advantage of developing countries, since
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the absolute and relative costs of production are lower in developing countries
than in industrial ones.

To that effect, the United States, along with other

industrial countries, have instituted incentives to help developing nations to
diversify their economies and accelerate development by providing access to
its markets through the Generalized System of Preference (GSP) and the Caribbean Basin Strategy.
The analysis of the Honduran economy indicates that the problems inherent in the industrial sector are not only related to current economic problems
but to structural and institutional deficiencies which must be addressed if
the export potential of the industrial sector is to be realized.

A perusal

of the Honduran external sector indicated that exports of non-traditional products remains low as Honduras continues to rely on the export of agricultural
products.
While Honduras has a geographical advantage to reach U. S. and Caribbean
markets, its industrial sector shows some weaknesses which may hamper, in the
short run, its ability to take full advantage of the preferential treatment
described below.

These weaknesses include the industrial product offering and

lack of marketing expertise in export activity.
The crux of the matter is the need of the industrial sector to develop
expertise in production, distribution and marketing of export products.

The

challenge faced by the industrialist-exporter is to develop an adequate product
for export markets as well as the managerial skills to plan strategy and effectively compete in foreign markets.

The offer made by the United States to

provide access to its markets in order to stimulate growth and development of
the industrial sector is likely to have little, if no effect, on the small and
medium sized firm with no marketing expertise and inadequate products for export
markets.

The markets of manufactured products in international trade is signifi-
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cantly different from trade in raw materials and agricultural products.
Trade activity of the latter is a relatively simple exchange of goods, buying
and selling operations which require little marketing effort.
ing and selling manufactured goods is a different situation.

However, buyMarketing exper-

tise becomes a primary activity of the firm in order to sell products which
serve a significantly wider range of consumer wants and needs which are geographically dispersed with varying levels of income, tastes and consumption
The adaption must be there if the Honduran industrialist-exporter

patterns.

is to realize the goal of developing an acceptable volume of exports of Honduran manufactured products.
V.

AN EXPORT DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR HONDURAS
The Honduran government should initiate, in cooperation with private sec-

tor, a fullfledged campaign to promote exports.

The export promotion activity

should make clear the role of the private sector and government activities in
export development and provide clear guidelines and mechanisms to achieve this
goal.
1.

In the short-term, the export development strategy should include

provisions to:
a.

Direct resources to develop adequate management/human resources

for export development.

This means extensive training and education with special

emphasis of the marketing aspects of exporting.
b.

Eliminate export disincentives like export taxes and other such

taxes that affect cost and efficiency in the export sector.
c.

Make financial resources available, at low cost, to qualified ex-

porters for market development and working capital.
d.

Promote the development of a prototype export trading company, to
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provide procurement, assembly, distribution and marketing functions to the export sector in specialized product areas and regions.

The key provisions of

this prototype organization should be to provide needed expertise to reach
the following long-term objectives:
-- specialization of product/geographical area

-- displacement of foreign-owned resources in export activities
-- centralization of buying, selling, and other marketing functions to escape
constraints imposed by small and medium sized production capabilities
-- centralization of financing functions in order to liberate industrial capital to expand industrial capabilities along export market needs
2.

In the long run, the export development strategy should aim to:

a.

Promote industries that provide domestic linkages (for example, agri-

business and labor-intensive industries) with identified export market potential.
b.

Develop the capabilities of domestic resources, especially managerial

resources, to displace foreign-owned resources in export industries.
c.

Phase out foreign ownership in qualified export enterprises and export

trading companies to develop a domestic resource base to benefit the Honduran
economy.
d.

Review the import substitution process to provide a more selective

process, providing protection to industries which provide linkages with domestic resources.
3. Gradually eliminate protection of assembly or convention-type industries to redirect resources to industrial activities with exportable supply.
On the long-run, the Central American countries must look for economic
cooperation in implementing export development policies.

The small size of
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each country's market precludes any significant development in the non-traditional
export sector that can realistically provide the foreign exchange earnings which
can contribute to the country's development process.

One country's isolated

export promotion programs can have a positive impact; however, a comprehensive
regional export development strategy that could help channel resources and investment in a balanced way could trigger a growing export sector with the managerial infrastructure needed to serve world markets.

This cooperative effort

should be the long-term objective of any regional strategy.

Should any Central

American countries initially refuse to participate in this effort, it could
still be promoted among two or more countries until a comprehensive, regional
policy could be developed.

In order to achieve this goal, one of the Central

American countries needs to take a leadership role, convincing government and
private sectors of the problem posed to the export sector and the resource allocation efficiency that could accrue to all participating nations.
The export development strategy outlined above should require a definite
commitment by the private sector to assume higher responsibility in the development process, providing more resources to the government so that excessive intervention in the economic system is unnecessary.

The rationality of the in-

ternational marketplace dictates new directions for the export sector.

Unless

some measures are introduced to promote development of the necessary expertise
to promote new mechanisms for the marketing of export products (as is the case
of the export trading compay) as well as other incentives to develop adequate
resources over the long-run, it is highly unlikely that countries like Honduras
can benefit from the U. S. offer in the long run.
The major problem is to achieve the adequate perspective on the problems
which are outlined in this paper.

This perspective calls for long-term solutions

to make the export sector a viable one.

This may well require changes in the
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economic, political and social structure and imply long-term solutions to. shortterm necessities.

Unless this perspective is achieved, any effort to stimulate

exports without the adequate development of resources may prove futile and
short-lived, and certainly not in a magnitude that can effectively help develop a dynamic industrial sector than can contribute to self-sustained growth
and development.
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